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Abstract
This document contains the updated version of the LIND(D)UN
threat tree catalog, which is part of the LIND(D)UN privacy threat
modeling methodology. The improvements are the result of a set of
extensive empirical studies. A summary is provided for each threat
category, followed by a detailed description of each of the corre-
sponding threat trees.
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Introduction 
LINDDUN1 is a privacy threat modeling methodology that aids the analyst in the elicitation of 
privacy threats. It is a model-based approach, as the methodology requires a data flow 
diagram (DFD) as representational model of the system to analyze. This DFD will serve as 
basis for the analysis, as each of its elements will be examined thoroughly for privacy 
threats. The methodology is also knowledge-based as it provides an overview of the most 
common attack paths associated with a set of privacy threat categories contained in the 
acronym LINDDUN (Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure of 
information, Unawareness, Non-compliance).  The attack paths are represented as threat 
trees that detail possible causes of threats that are related to the main threat categories and 
are specific to a particular DFD element type (entity, data flow, data store, or process). 
This document contains the updated version of the LIND(D)UN threat tree catalog. The 
improvements are based on the results of a set of extensive empirical studies2.  
A summary is provided for each threat category, followed by a detailed description of each 
of the corresponding threat trees. More information on the methodology can be found on 
the LIND(D)UN website3.  
                                                        
1  Mina Deng, Kim Wuyts, Riccardo Scandariato, Bart Preneel, Wouter Joosen,  A privacy threat 
analysis framework: supporting the elicitation and fulfillment of privacy requirements, Requirements 
Engineering Journal, volume 16, issue 1, pages 3-32, 2011 
2
 Kim Wuyts, Riccardo Scandariato, Wouter Joosen, Empirical evaluation of a privacy-focused threat 
modeling methodology, The Journal of Systems and Software, volume 96, pages 122-138, October 
2014 
3
 LINDDUN privacy threat modeling website 
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Linkability 
In general 
Being able to sufficiently distinguish whether 2 IOI (items of interest) are linked or not, even 
WITHOUT knowing the actual identity of the subject of the linkable IOI. 
Not being able to hide the link between two or more actions/identities/pieces of 
information.[1] 
Examples are: anonymous letters written by the same person, web page visits by the same 
user, entries in two databases related to the same person, people related by a friendship 
link, etc. 
Note that often linkability involves IOIs that are linked because they belong to the same 
subject, however, IOIs can also be linked based on properties (e.g. people visiting the same 
restaurant, people with a similar disease, etc.). 
Consequences 
 Can lead to identifiability (see Identifiability trees) when too much linkable 
information is combined 
 Can lead to inference: when “group data” is linkable, this can lead to societal harm, 
like discrimination (e.g. if an insurance company knows that people who live in a 
certain area get sick more often, they might increase their insurance cost for that 
target group) 
Impacted by 
 Data minimization: the less info is available, the better (see L_DS for more info) (+) 
 Identifiability: if the subject’s identity is known, all related data can obviously be 
linked (-) 
[1] More information about (un)linkability is available in Pfitzmann, Andreas and Hansen, Marit, A 
terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, Unlinkability, 
Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management, v0.34, Technical Report, 
2010 
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Linkability of an entity 
 
Tree in general 
These threats mainly focus on a subject (the entity) who wants to hide as much of his 
identifiable information (or at least make it as unlikable as possible). This can occur when the 
subject wants to authenticate himself to a certain service (multiple authentication principles 
are shown in the tree), but also during regular communication (browsing, client-server 
requests, etc.) by means of the contextual information used for the communication. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
When using a linkable login in combination with untrusted communication, the entity can 
become linkable (L_e1). 
Linkable login (L_e2) 
A linkable login (L_e2) can be a "fixed" login (L_e4), like an e-id or a username-
password combination, which is being used more than once. As it is being reused, its 
corresponding IOIs are also linkable based on this login. 
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Alternatively, using very detailed certificates (L_e5) as means of authentication can lead to 
linkable logins. For example, certain online services are location-dependent and require 
users to reside in a certain country. This can be checked in multiple ways. Ideally the 
certificate (authorized by for example the government or another trusted certificate 
authority) only proves that the user is indeed a citizen of the required country. However, a 
more detailed certificate can provide the entire address of the user to prove his residence. 
As an address is unique (disregarding the fellow residents), the certificate becomes a linkable 
login. 
Untrusted communication (L_e3) 
A linkable login will however only lead to linkability of the entity when used over untrusted 
communication (L_e3) 
Clearly, when the communication is not secure, the linkable login can be 
easily disclosed (ID_DF). Note that this information disclosure threat is applicable 
to all communication that transfers the entity's linkable credentials. Usually, this 
communication is limited to the information flow between the user and service, but when 
the service transfers the credentials to another service (e.g. a third party authentication 
service like Facebook Login), obviously also this communication should remain confidential. 
Similarly, when the receiver of the data is untrustworthy (L_e6) (e.g. he fails to anonymize 
the data during processing or shares the information with other parties), the subject, and all 
the data he has communicated, become linkable. Note that this receiver can be the service 
the subject is directly communicating with, but also additional (third party) services that are 
used by the intended receiver of which the subject might be unaware. 
Finally, it is also possible that the receiver is trustworthy and handles the linkable logins in a 
privacy-friendly fashion by anonymizing them, however, the anonymized logins are 
easily linkable in the identity management database (database where internal identifiers 
are managed and linked to their user accounts)(L_DS). Of course, this is only an issue when 
this identity management database is not secure. 
Linkability base on metadata of entity communication (metadata linkability at 
L_DF) 
Even when no linkable credentials are used, the user can still be linked based on the 
contextual information of his communication (e.g. based on his IP address or his online 
behavior) (linkability of contextual data at L_DF). This threat only applies to the 
communication that is directly connected to the entity, meaning the entity is the sender or 
receiver of the communication. 
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Linkability of a dataflow 
 
Tree in general 
A distinction should be made between linkability of the contextual data (e.g. IP address 
necessary for communication) and the transactional data (the actual data that are being 
communicated). 
Contextual data linkability can be resolved by, for example, anonymous routing solutions 
and should be applied by the sender and/or receiver to protect their own unlinkability. 
Transactional data, however, does not necessarily have the sender or receiver as data 
subject, but can involve a third party subject as well (e.g. when two doctors share 
information about a patient, this patient is the data subject of the transactional data while 
he is not involved in the actual communication). 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Linkability of transactional data (L_DF1) 
Transactional data linkability (L_DF1) can occur when the transmitted data becomes 
available to an untrusted party (L_DF3). This either means that the communication is 
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unprotected (L_DF6) and hence information disclosure threats (ID_DF) apply, or that 
a receiver cannot be trusted(L_DF7). This receiver can be the direct receiver of the 
information, or can be a “future” receiver when the receiving party communicates the 
transactional data to other parties (e.g. when the accounting is being outsourced to a third 
party). 
Sharing data with untrusted parties will however only lead to linkability when 
the information that is made available is actually linkable (insufficient minimization 
inference of L_DS). This mainly occurs when the data that are being sent are not being 
minimized sufficiently. When protecting a user’s privacy ideally only the minimal set of 
information should be provided. 
Linkability of contextual data (L_DF2) 
Contextual data becomes linkable (L_DF2) when non-anonymous 
communication (L_DF4) is used. The data flow can be for example linked on IP 
address (L_DF8), computer iD (L_DF9), session ID (L_DF10), or even based on certain 
patterns (L_DF11) (like time, frequency, and location or browser setting, etc.). 
Alternatively, it is possible that the anonymity system that is being used is insecure (L_DF5). 
This can enables traffic analysis (L_DF12) to extract information out of patterns of traffic; 
passive attacks (L_DF14), like long-term intersection attacks, traffic correlation and 
confirmation, fingerprinting, epistemic attacks (route selection), and predecessor attacks; 
or active attacks(L_DF13), like N-1 attacks, Sybil attack, traffic watermarking, tagging attack, 
replay, and DoS attack. More information about these attacks can be found in [1]. 
[1] G. Danezis, C. Diaz, and P. Syverson, Systems for Anonymous Communication, in CRC Handbook of 
Financial Cryptography and Security, p. 61. Chapman & Hall, 2009. 
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Linkability of a data store 
 
Tree in general 
Linkability in a data store occurs when one has access to the data store and when insufficient 
data minimization is applied. This means that too much data are being stored which enables 
a large set of information that can be used (e.g. by data miners) to look for links. 
The most obvious consequence of linking lots of information is that more pseudo-identifiers 
are linked which can result in identifiability (e.g. knowing one's city, gender, age or even first 
name does not reveal an identity, but when combined the anonymity set suddenly becomes 
a lot smaller and can already lead to identification, depending on the city's population size 
and the uniqueness of the person's first name. Thus the more data available and linkable 
(based on (pseudo)identifiers), the more likely the chance of identification. 
Another result of linkability is inference. Instead of linking data that belongs to the same 
person, data are linked based on certain properties to deduce relationships between them 
and generalize them. This can be used in a rather innocent fashion to determine the best 
way to organize groceries in a grocery store (e.g. people who buy hamburgers usually buy 
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buns at the same time, hence they are stored close to each other). This inference can 
however also have a more judgmental nature if it is used to discriminate a certain 
population (e.g. people living in a certain neighborhood have a higher chance of cancer, 
hence their health insurance fee is higher than the surrounding cities). Inference can thus 
lead to societal harm. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Weak access control (L_DS1) 
A requirement for linkability in the data store is weak access control to the data 
store (L_DS1). This can occur when the data are not stored in a confidential fashion and 
hence information disclosure threats exist (ID_DS). 
Insufficient minimization/Inference (L_DS2) 
When having access to the data store, linkability becomes a threat when data 
is insufficiently minimized (L_DS2) [1]. The more information is available the higher the 
chance of inference, which is a key element of data mining that derives ideas and 
conclusions by combining (linkable) information. 
The data can be linked to data in another database (L_DS3). This other database can be 
both internal to the system that is being analyzed or external (data from a partner company, 
public data online, like Facebook data, etc.)[2]. 
Or, simply too much data are available (L_DS4) in the data store that is being analyzed. This 
can occur when data are stored too long (L_DS5) instead of removing them when no longer 
needed (and thus resulting in too much information) or storing more information than 
required (L_DF6) for the purpose of collection (e.g. storing a subject's entire address when 
only his city is required). Both data retention and data minimization threats originate from 
the data protection legislation principles. 
[1] Note that this minimization branch can also be considered from a wider perspective, when one 
does not (only) focus on data minimization, but also minimization of central storage, of risk, of trust, 
etc. This tree does however only discuss minimization of data, as it is the main privacy concern 
regarding privacy. 
[2] When this additional database is an identity management database that stores account data (and 
the login is identifiable), linking the IOIs to this database will result in identifiability. 
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Linkability of a process 
 
Tree in general 
The threat tree of linkability of process suggests that the only way to prevent different 
actions being linked to the same subject is by gaining access to the process. Note that this 
threat is very rare. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Linkability of a process can only occur after information disclosure of this process (ID_P). 
We therefore refer to that tree. 
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Identifiability 
In general 
Being able to sufficiently identify the subject within a set of subjects (i.e. the anonymity set). 
Not being able to hide the link between the identity and the IOI (an action or piece of 
information) [1]. 
Examples are: identifying the reader of a web page, the sender of an email, the person to 
whom an entry in a database relates, etc. 
Consequences 
 Can lead to severe privacy violations (when subject assumes he is anonymous) 
Impacted by 
 Data minimization: the less info is available, the better (see L_DS for more info) (+) 
 Linkability: the more information is linked, the higher the chance the combined data 
are identifiable (the more attributes are known, the smaller the anonymity set) (-) 
[1] More information about anonymity and pseudonymity is available in Pfitzmann, Andreas and 
Hansen, Marit, A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, 
Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management, v0.34, 
Technical Report, 2010 
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Identifiability of entity 
 
Tree in general 
These threats mainly focus on a subject (the entity) who wants to hide as much of his 
identifiable information as possible. This can occur when the subject wants to authenticate 
himself to a certain service (multiple authentication principles are shown in the tree), but 
also when (anonymously) browsing by means of the contextual information using for the 
communication. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
When an identifiable login is used and is communicated in an untrustworthy matter, the 
entity can be identifiable (I_e1). 
Identifiable login used (I_e2) 
Several types of identifiable logins exist. The most obvious is the e-id (I_e7), which means 
using your real identity (I_e4). 
Alternatively, a pseudo-identity (I_e5) can be used. The most common pseudo-identity is a 
pseudonym (I_e8), using a username-password combination. Although in theory this can 
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provide anonymity (you can choose an unrelated username and password, or it can be 
assigned to you), in practice this pseudonym is often not very anonymous. Either 
the username can be easily linked(I_e18) to the user's identity (e.g. the user's firstname 
and/or lastname) or even the password(I_e17) can contain identifiable information (people 
tend to use easy to remember password like their birthday). Another pseudo-identifier can 
be a token (I_e9), which can be either a hardware(I_e15) or software (I_e14) token [1] (e.g. 
a smartcard, usb token, a disconnected token, a file, etc.). When the token is badly designed 
(either physically or implementation-wise), the entity can be identified. A final type of 
pseudo-identity is biometrics (I_e10) (e.g. fingerprints) that are identifiable when the 
biometrics themselves can be linked back to the actual identity (I_e16). 
Another type of identifiers are certificates (I_e6). They are the most privacy-friendly 
authentication type as they only aim at proving certain properties about the entity (e.g. 
older than 18, living in the US, female, etc.). The entity can however still become identifiable 
when the certificate contains too much (precise) properties (L_e11). The more specific a 
certificate is (and thus unique), the more identifiable it becomes. 
Untrusted communication (I_e3) 
An identifiable login can lead to identifiability of an entity when this login is used 
over untrusted communication (I_e3). This subtree is actually very similar to the untrusted 
communication subtree of linkability (L_e3) as the threats are closely related. 
When the communication is not secure, the identifiable login can be easily 
disclosed (ID_DF). This information disclosure threat is applicable to all communication that 
transfers the entity's identifiable credentials. This communication is not necessarily limited 
to the information flow between the user and service, as the service can decide to transfers 
the credentials to another service (e.g. a third party authentication service like Facebook 
Login). Obviously, also this communication should remain confidential. 
Similarly, when the receiver of the data is untrustworthy (I_e6) (e.g. he fails to anonymize 
the data during processing or shares the information with other parties), the subject, and all 
the data he has communicated, become identifiable. Note that this receiver can be the 
service the subject is directly communicating with, but also additional (third party) services 
that are used by the intended receiver of which the subject might be unaware. 
Also, when the user is not careful when storing his credentials (I_e20) (e.g. writing 
username and password on a paper near the computer, failing to install security measures 
which allow keyloggers or other kinds of eavesdropping, etc.), the identifiable login can be 
easily intercepted and hence the entity becomes identifiable. 
Finally, even when the receiver is trustworthy and stores the identifiable user credentials in 
a privacy-friendly fashion by anonymizing them, the entity can become identifiable when the 
anonymized logins are identifiable in the identity management database (I_DS) if it is not 
properly secured (e.g. having an identity management database where the full credentials 
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are stored, and an internal (anonymized) identifier for the main data; however, the IDM 
database is not encrypted). 
Identifiability based on metadata of entity communication (identifiability of 
contextual data at I_DF) 
Even when no identifiable credentials are used, the user can still be identified based on the 
contextual information of his communication (e.g. based on his IP address or his online 
behavior) (identifiability of contextual data at I_DF). This threat only applies to the 
communication that is directly connected to the entity, meaning the entity is the sender or 
receiver of the communication. 
[1] Wikipedia provides a nice overview of the different kinds of security tokens 
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Identifiability of data flow 
 
Tree in general 
A distinction should be made between identifiability of the contextual data (e.g. IP address 
necessary for communication) and the transactional data (the actual data that are being 
communicated). 
Contextual data identifiability can be resolved by, for example, anonymous routing solutions 
and should be applied by the sender and/or receiver to protect their own anonymity. 
Transactional data, however, does not necessarily have the sender or receiver as data 
subject, but can involve a third party subject as well (e.g. when two doctors share 
information about a patient, this patient is the data subject of the transactional data while 
he is not involved in the actual communication). Transactional data identifiability can occur 
when the flow is unprotected and hence information disclosure threats apply, and, when 
this disclosed information itself is identifiable. Another threat to transactional data 
identifiability exists when the data is being sent to an untrustworthy receiver (or future 
receiver). Transactional data identifiability should be resolved at the origin of the data or at 
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least before the data cross a trust boundary (which can thus be much earlier in the flow than 
the current sender). 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Identifiability of transactional data (I_DF1) 
Transactional data identifiability (L_DF1) can occur when the transmitted data becomes 
available to an untrusted party (I_DF3). This either means that the communication is 
unprotected(I_DF4) and hence information disclosure threats (ID_DF) apply, or that 
a receiver cannot be trusted (I_DF5). This receiver can be the direct receiver of the 
information, or can be a "future"• receiver when the receiving party communicates the 
transactional data to other parties (e.g. when the accounting is being outsourced to a third 
party). 
Sharing data with untrusted parties will however only lead to linkability when 
the information that is made available is actually linkable (insufficient minimization of 
I_DS). This mainly occurs when the data that are being sent are not being minimized 
sufficiently. When protecting a user's privacy ideally only the minimal set of information 
should be provided. 
Identifiability of contextual data (I_DF2) 
This subtree is actually identical to the subtree of linkability (L_DF2). The summary of this 
subtree will thus be similar as well. Note however that is, generally speaking, easier to link 
data flows based on their contextual information, than actually identify (e.g. knowing that a 
certain user visits website X every day at 8PM will make his actions linkable based on this 
time pattern, however, this does not provide sufficient information to actually identify him). 
Contextual data becomes identifiability (I_DF2) when non-anonymous 
communication(I_DF6) is used. The data flow can be for example linked on IP 
address (I_DF8), computer iD(I_DF9), session ID (I_DF10), or even based on certain 
patterns (I_DF11) (like time, frequency, and location or browser setting, etc.). 
Alternatively, it is possible that the anonymity system that is being used in insecure (I_DF7). 
This can enables traffic analysis (I_DF12) to extract information out of patterns of traffic; 
passive attacks (I_DF13), like long-term intersection attacks, traffic correlation and 
confirmation, fingerprinting, epistemic attacks (route selection), and predecessor attacks; 
or active attacks(I_DF14), like N-1 attacks, Sybil attack, traffic watermarking, tagging attack, 
replay, and DoS attack. More information about these attacks can be found in the work of 
Danezis, Diaz, and Syverson[1]. 
[1] G. Danezis, C. Diaz, and P. Syverson, Systems for Anonymous Communication, in CRC Handbook of 
Financial Cryptography and Security, p. 61. Chapman & Hall, 2009. 
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Identifiability of data store 
 
Tree in general 
Identifiability at a data store can only occur when the data store itself is not sufficiently 
protected. 
When the data store can be accessed and the data are insufficiently anonymized, the data 
can become identifiable. Either because the data are identified because they are linked to 
(identifiable) login data, or because the data are re-identified by lack of (sufficient) data 
minimization. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Weak access control (I_DS1) 
In order to have identifiability at the data store, one needs access to it. Thus weak access 
control(I_DS1) is a prerequisite, which is possible when there is information disclosure at 
the data store(ID_DS). 
Weak anonymization/ inference (I_DS2) 
When access to the data store is provided, data become identifiable when there is weak 
data anonymization . (and/or when inference techniques are applied) (I_DS2). This can 
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occur in two ways. Either the data are identified by means of login data (I_DS3) when the 
data are linkable to login data (I_DS5) [1] and these login data are identifiable (identifiable 
login used of I_E). 
Or, the data can be re-identified (I_DS4) because they are insufficiently 
minimized(insufficient minimization at L_DS) and given the abundance of linked data, 
they become identifiable (I_DS6). Clearly, the more information is available, the more 
unique it becomes and hence the smaller the anonymity set. 
[1] This node is actually a specific case of the L_DS3 leaf node (data linkable to other database). 
When the other database contains identifiable data, like an identity management database does, the 
entire dataset becomes identifiable 
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Identifiability of a Process 
 
Tree in general 
The threat tree of Identifiability of process suggests that the only way to prevent different 
actions being linked to the same subject is by gaining access to the process. Note that this 
threat is very rare. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Identifiability of a process can only occur after information disclosure of this process (ID_P). 
We therefore refer to that tree. 
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Non-repudiation 
In general 
Not being able to deny a claim. 
The attacker can thus prove a user knows, has done or has said something. He can gather 
evidence to counter the claims of the repudiating party. 
Typical non-repudiation examples exist in the context of anonymous online voting systems, 
and whistleblowing systems where plausible deniability is required. 
Note that this threat is actually a security goal, as for certain systems (e.g. systems where 
payments are involved) non-repudiation is an important asset. This should however not 
result in any conflicts, as systems that require non-repudiation as a security goal, will not 
need plausible deniability for the same data/ subsystem. 
Consequences 
 Accountability: when a person is not able to repudiate an action or piece of 
information, he can be held accountable. (e.g. a whistleblower can be prosecuted) 
Impacted by 
 Identifiability: if data are identifiable, it will be hard to repudiate (-) 
  
22 
 
Non-repudiation of data flow 
 
Tree in general 
Non-repudiation of a data flow implies that the subject cannot deny having sent a message. 
This can occur when data sources of flows are insufficiently obfuscated, when weak deniable 
encryption, weak MACs, or weak off-the-record messaging are used. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Four types of threats can lead to non-repudiation of data flow. 
Insufficient data sources or data flows obfuscation (NR_DF1) 
The first type is insufficient obfuscation for data sources or data flows, which means that the 
attacker can gain access to at least part of the data flow or data source. This can occur in a 
number of cases, for example, there is no automatic replay of broadcasts (NR_DF5), such 
that the sender of a file is sufficiently distinguishable from those who are merely relaying it. 
Another example is when a complete decrypted log of all network connections to and from 
a user's computer is disclosed (NR_DF7), resulting in the disclosure of the origin of data 
flow. The final examples are that there is insufficient protection against 
censors (NR_DF6) or insufficient obfuscation of data extensions (NR_DF8), such that 
operators or users of the network are able to know where the data comes from. 
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No or weak deniable encryption (NR_DF2) 
The second type of threat is that little or a weak deniable encryption technique is used to 
protect data flow. One possible attack path is to prove data is encrypted (NR_DF9), either 
the encrypter proves the data is obviously an encryption (NR_DF15) or colluding users 
prove together that the data is encrypted (NR_16). 
The second attack path is to prove data can be decrypted to a valid plain text (NR_DF11), 
which can occur when the encrypter decrypts the file (NR_DF17) or colluding users can 
cooperate and show the decrypted message (NR_DF18). 
The third attack path shows that all private keys are disclosed (NR_DF10), which clearly 
enables decryption. 
Finally, also cryptanalysis (NR_DF12) is possible to attack the used encryption scheme. 
No or weak MACs used (NR_DF3) 
The third type of threat is the lack of strong message authentication codes 
(MAC) (NR_DF3) to ensure integrity of data flow content, such that an attacker can forge 
authentic looking messages and pretend that a certain data flow comes from a subject. 
No or weak off-the-record messaging (NR_DF4) 
The final precondition indicates that there is little or a weak Off-the-Record Messaging 
(OTR)(NR_DF4) used, such that in a conversation it is not possible to provide both deniability 
for the conversation participants and confidentiality of conversations content at the same 
time. Possible attack paths include replaying of previous transferred messages (NR_DF13), 
and the use of signatures (NR_DF14) to demonstrate communication events, participants 
and communication content. 
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Non-repudiation of data store 
 
 
Tree in general 
Non-repudiation in the data store refers to the threat where a subject is not able to deny 
certain data in the database. This can be either data he has stored himself or data that 
others have stored about the subject. 
 
Leaf nodes explanation 
No or weak deniable encryption (NR_DS1) 
When little or a weak deniable encryption (NR_DS1) is used to protect the data, it can be 
proven that data are an encryption (NR_DS4) or can be decrypted to a valid 
plaintext(NR_DS5). 
Weak access control to the database (NR_DS2) 
When there is weak access control to the database (NR_DS2), the stored data are no longer 
deniable. This can occur when there is a threat of information disclosure at the data 
store(ID_DS). 
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Person wanting deniability cannot edit database(NR_DS3) 
If subjects want deniability but are not able to edit data in the database (NR_DS3) to cover 
their tracks, their data becomes non-reputable. It can be either impossible to remove or 
alter the user's own data (NR_DS6) or impossible to remove or alter someone else's data 
concerning the user himself (NR_DS7). 
Note that this threat does not apply solely to a database that can be directly accessed by the 
user. It applies to all collected data.  
For example, Google has to implement the 'right to be forgotten' which allows data subjects 
to request removal of personal information from Google's search index if the links are 
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they were processed [1] [2]. 
 
[1] Factsheet of European Commission on the right to be forgotten 
[2] This is actually an extension of the unawareness threat regarding data reviewal (U_5 in 
the unawareness tree). Not only should a subject be aware of the data that is collected about him 
(U), he should also be able to revoke it (NR). 
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Non-repudiation of a process 
 
Tree in general 
Non-repudiation of a process implies that it cannot be denied that the process has been run. 
It is however a very rare threat. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Non-repudiation of a process can be achieved in two ways. 
Either the process loses its confidentiality and information disclosure attacks at the 
process(ID_P) are possible, or the process uses a secure log (NR_P1) to create an overview 
of all actions, which can evidently be traced back to the user. 
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Detectability 
In general 
Being able to sufficiently distinguish whether an item of interest (IOI) exists or not. 
Note that detectability does not imply information disclosure. Detectability concerns IOIs of 
which the content is not known (to the attacker). 
Consequences 
 Inference: by detecting whether an IOI exists, one can deduce certain information, 
even without actually having access to that information (e.g. by knowing that a 
celebrity has a health record in a rehab facility, you can deduce the celebrity has an 
addiction, even without having access to the actual health record) 
Impacted by 
 / 
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Detectability of a dataflow 
 
Tree in general 
Knowing that a message is sent, without actually knowing what is contained in the message, 
can often reveal additional (sensitive) information. For example, when a smart grid system 
only sends consumption messages from the customer’s home system to the back-end when 
electricity is being consumed, detecting that such a message [1] is sent to the back-end 
reveals that there are currently people in the house. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
No or weak covert channel (D_DF1) 
A first type of threat that can lead to detectability of a data flow is that the system lacks a 
covert channel (D_DF1). This can happen when the covert channel uses too much 
bandwidth from a legitimate channel (D_DF6), resulting in the detection of the covert 
communication. It can also be because the patterns or characteristics of the 
communications medium of the legitimate channel are controlled or examined by legitimate 
users (D_DF7), e.g. checking file opening and closing operations patterns (D_DF12) or 
watching the timing of requests (D_DF13), such that covert communication is detected. 
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Side channel attacks (D_DF2) 
Side channel analysis (D_DF2) can be based on timing information, power consumption, 
electromagnetic leaks, etc. It is used as an extra source of information which can be 
exploited to detect the communication. 
Weak information hiding (D_DF3) 
When weak information hiding techniques (D_DF3) are used, steganalysis attacks (D_DF8 ) 
are possible (detecting messages hidden using steganography). 
No or insufficient dummy traffic (D_DF4) 
Transmitted data can become detectable when there is no or insufficient dummy 
traffic (D_DF4)sent at some lower layer of the communication network, such that messages 
fail to appear random for all parties except the sender and the recipient(s). 
Weak spread spectrum communication (D_DF5) 
The detectability threat can occur because of a weak spread spectrum 
communication(D_DF5), resulting in deficiencies in the establishment of secure 
communications (allowing eavesdropping (D_DF9)), insufficient resistance to 
natural interference and jamming(D_DF10), and insufficient resistance to fading (D_DF11). 
 
[1] In practice, certain household appliances will still be consuming electricity, even though nobody is 
home. Therefore, detecting messages being sent at irregular or very short intervals, will reveal that 
someone is home. 
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Detectability of a Data store 
 
Tree in general 
Knowing that an IOI exists, without actually having access to it, can already reveal (possibly 
sensitive) information. For example, knowing that a rehab clinic has a file on a certain 
celebrity, already reveals information (i.e. the celebrity has been in rehab), without actually 
having access to the file. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Detectability at the data store can occur when there is insufficient access control (D_DS1), 
because of information disclosure threats (ID_DS) and if insufficient information hiding 
techniques (D_DS2) are applied, such that information is revealed due to weak 
steganography algorithms which enable steganalysis attacks (D_DS3). 
Note that the access control should not only apply to the actual data but also to their 
corresponding metadata, as knowing that an item exists without actually having access to it, 
can also reveal sensitive information. 
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Detectability of a Process 
 
Tree in general 
Detectability of process implies that it can be detected that the process has been run. It is 
however a very rare threat. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Identifiability of a process can only occur after Similar to the other privacy threats related to 
a process, the detectability of process threat also refers to the threat of information 
disclosure of this process (ID_P). We therefore refer to that tree. 
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Information Disclosure 
Note that the information disclosure trees are not part of LINDDUN, but of 
Microsoft's STRIDE. As privacy depends on security, LINDDUN also includes 
STRIDE's Information Disclosure threats (which, on their turn, refer to other STRIDE 
trees).  
It is however advised to execute a full security analysis in advance or in parallel 
with LINDDUN. 
 
Tree in general 
The threat tree concerning information disclosure of data flow, data store, and 
process refers to the security threat tree of information disclosure. This illustrates the fact 
that privacy properties are part of security properties, and privacy may depend on security. 
Please access the corresponding STRIDE threat trees through the links in the second 
navigation bar on the left. 
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Unwareness 
In general 
Being unaware of the consequences of sharing information. 
Often users are not aware of the impact of sharing data. This can be data shared to friends 
on facebook, but also personal information shared with other services (i.e. loyalty cards, 
online services, …) 
Unawareness threats differ from data minimization threats (L_DS) in the sense that 
concerning data minimization it is the responsibility of the (back-end) system to minimize 
the data that are being stored, while for unawareness it is the provider of the data himself 
who is responsible and should be aware of the consequences of sharing (too much) 
information. Nevertheless, the system itself can support the users in making privacy-aware 
decisions. 
Ideally, all users (data providers) should be clearly informed and educated of the 
consequences of sharing data using (online) services. Our analysis can however not impact 
the entire society, hence these threats will only focus on the provisions the system itself can 
take to guide and educate the user concerning his data sharing. 
This threat only applies to an entity, as other DFD elements do not input additional 
information in the system. 
Consequences 
 Linkability/ identifiability: the more information is available, the easier it can be 
linked (and identified) 
Impacted by 
 / 
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Unawareness of entity 
 
Tree in general 
The user provides more personal identifiable information than required (about himself or 
another data subject), which has a negative influence on all the hard privacy objectives 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Providing too much information (U_1) 
Unawareness often means the user provides too much (personal) information (U_1). This is 
specifically problematic when this information is identifiable, or when this information when 
combined with the already available data becomes identifiable. This threat thus closely 
relates to the identifiability threats concerning data minimization. 
Currently some privacy-friendly techniques exist to assist the user in making aware decisions 
concerning the sharing of his data. When these techniques are not employed, the awareness 
is obviously threatened. Feedback and awareness tools (feedback tools that improve the 
user's understanding of privacy implications [1], or tools that visualize the user's data like the 
IdentityMirror [2] and privacy mirrors [3] ) provide feedback on the data the user wants to 
share and presents its results when combined with already available (online) information.  
Also several types of nudges have been proposed for social networks to encourage the user 
to reflect on the information he wants to share [4] [5]: sentiment nudges that inform the 
user how a certain message might be perceived, picture nudges that show profile pictures of 
35 
 
(some) users that will be able to see the post, etc.  
Facebook already provides some privacy feedback as it allows the user to access his timeline 
with the access control settings of a specific user. This raises awareness and can help 
prevent the oversharing of information.  
When no feedback and awareness tools(U_3) are used, the user is likely not aware of the 
information (or its impact) he is sharing. 
Also, privacy support should be user-friendly (U_4). For example, default settings (e.g. 
facebook settings) should be privacy-friendly.  It should be prevented that information is 
automatically shared with many parties, often without knowledge of the user. Privacy-
friendly settings should limit the exposure of (personal) data. 
Also, in order for users to modify privacy settings according to their needs, the provided 
tools should be easy to use. The privacy configuration (e.g. Facebook privacy settings) should 
be easy to access and manage and should be represented in an understandable fashion. 
 
Data accuracy (U_2) 
Often data subjects are unaware of what data a system has actually collected and stored 
about him. A data subject should thus always have the possibility to review his own 
data (i.e. data that has been collected about him)[6].  
 
[1] Lederer, s., Hong, J., Dey, A., Landay, J.: Personal Privacy through Understanding and Action: Five 
Pitfalls for Designers. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 8, 440--454 (2004) 
[2] Liu, H., Maes, P., Davenport, G.: Unraveling the Taste Fabric of Social Networks. International 
Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems (IJSWIS) 2(1) 
[3] Nguyen, D., Mynatt, E.: Privacy Mirrors: Understanding and Shaping Socio-technical Ubiquitous 
Computing Systems. (2001) 
[4] Yang Wang, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Kevin Scott, Xiaoxuan Chen, Alessandro Acquisti, and Lorrie 
Faith Cranor. 2013. Privacy nudges for social media: an exploratory Facebook study. In Proceedings of 
the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web companion (WWW '13 Companion). 763-770. 
[5] Presentation by Lorrie Cranor on Privacy Nudges and Self-Censorship on Social 
Media (summarizing [5]) 
[6] Note that a data subject should even be able to request updates of the data if certain information 
is no longer applicable or correct. This is however included in the Non-Repudiation threat tree 
(NR_ds7) as it not specific to user awareness. 
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Non-compliance 
In general 
Not being compliant with legislation, regulations, and corporate policies. 
Consequences 
 Can lead to fines (when violating legislation, or not adhering to the communicated 
corporate policies) 
 Can lead to loss of image, credibility, etc. 
Impacted by 
 Security officer/legal audit/… : a person responsible for the system's compliance (+) 
 Tampering with the policy data store: when the policy database is not tamper-proof, 
attackers can alter the access control policies and user consents of the system (-) 
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Non-Compliance 
No distinction is made between the different DFD elements, as compliance 
generally applies to the system as a whole. 
 
 
Tree in general 
A system is compliant when it adheres to its communicated corporate policies, to all (data 
protection) legislation, and to the user's consents. 
The tree only aims at identifying compliance issues (related to privacy) from a high-level 
perspective. To ensure full compliance, we advice the assistance of a legal expert. 
Leaf nodes explanation 
Legal compliance is a very complicated domain and will generally require the assistance of a 
legal expert. Related work exists that summarizes the most common principles in data 
protection legislation.  
Anton, Earp, and Reese [1] summarize 5 privacy protection goals as notice/awareness, 
choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, enforcement/redress.  
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Guarda and Zannone present 9 privacy principles [2]: fair and lawful processing, consent, 
purpose specification, minimality, minimal disclosure, information quality, data subject 
control, sensitivity, and information security. 
Privacy policies can have several origins. They can be imposed by law (like data protection 
legislation), but also each company has its own corporate policies (which are also 
communicated with the users) to which the system should adhere. On top of that, the users 
themselves can also be involved in the privacy rules by means of consents. Users should be 
able to decide what happens with their data and who has access to their information. They 
can elicit their rules in the form of user consents. These consents can either be to allow 
certain actions to their personal information. Examples are: allow data to be used for 
research, or allow data to be communicated with a third party, or even allow person X to 
access (and/or update) my personal data). A consent can also restrict access, when a user 
decides he does not want a certain person or party to access his personal information (e.g. 
prohibit your neighbor who works in a hospital to access your medical records). Consents 
and privacy policies in general can, and should, be integrated into the system's access 
control policies as much as possible. 
Attacker tampering with privacy policies and makes consents inconsistent (NC_1) 
When the privacy policies and consents are integrated in the access control system, it is 
important that they are stored in a correct and consistent fashion. Clearly, when an attacker 
can tamper with the policies (NC_1), the attacker can alter or remove the policies (and 
consents) and the system can no longer ensure compliance. This can happen when the 
database that stores the policies is susceptible to tampering threats (T_DS of STRIDE). 
Incorrect or insufficient privacy policies (NC_2) 
To "automate" compliance, these policies need to be enforced in the system. When 
the privacy policies are incorrectly or insufficiently implemented (NC_2), the system will 
not be compliant. When insufficient policy management (NC_3) is provided, the system will 
not be compliant to the user consent requirements. Insufficient policy management exists 
when the system does not provide (user-friendly) support to the user to create or update 
user consents, or, when the created user consents are not correctly enforced in the system. 
This insufficient policy management can be both accidental and intentional. 
Finally, also related to the system's corporate policies is the threat related to notice (NC_4) 
Clear, transparent notice of the applied policies should be provided to all users to inform 
them about the data that will be collected, stored, and processed [3]. 
 
Note that these threats are only related to privacy policies. Data protection compliance spans 
a much broad range of threats (most of which also occur in other LINDDUN threat trees). 
Those threats are mainly related to storage and overall management of data that is not 
compliant with legislation or the specified corporate policies. They include (but are not 
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limited to): insufficient minimization (collecting and storing too much information with 
respect to its purpose), storing data too long (data retention), storing sensitive data without 
the necessary precautions (anonymizing, encrypting,...), not providing the data subjects with 
access to their data, not respecting the 'right to be forgotten', ... 
To guarantee full legal compliance, we advice the assistance of a legal expert. 
 
[1] Anton, A.I.; Earp, J.B.; Reese, A., 2002, "Analyzing Website privacy requirements using a privacy 
goal taxonomy," Requirements Engineering, 2002. Proceedings. IEEE Joint International Conference 
on , pp.23,31 
[2] Paolo Guarda and Nicola Zannone. 2009. "Towards the development of privacy-aware 
systems".Inf. Softw. Technol. 51, 2 (February 2009),pp. 337-350. 
[3] Tools like Privacy Bird have already emerged that inform users about how information they 
provide to websites could be used. These tools interpret the website’s privacy policies and translate 
them to information that is easier to grasp (as privacy policies are hardly ever read by users because 
they tend to be very extensive and hard to comprehend). 
Ideally however, each system provides its own easy to grasp notice. 
 
 
 
